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Broadly de½ned, af½rmative action encompasses
any measure that allocates resources–such as
admission to selective universities or profession-
al schools, jobs, promotions, public contracts,
business loans, or rights to buy, sell, or use land–
through a process that takes into account individ-
ual membership in underrepresented groups. Its
purpose is to increase the proportion of individu-
als from those groups in the labor force, entrepre-
neurial class, or student population from which
they have been excluded as a result of state-sanc-
tioned oppression in the past or societal discrimi-
nation in the present. According to legal scholar
Sean Pager, “Unlike traditional welfare policies
grounded in distributional equity, af½rmative ac-
tion takes its moral force from a corrective justice
ideal.”1 It allocates scarce resources so as to reme-
dy a speci½c type of disadvantage, one that arises
from the illegitimate use of a morally irrelevant
characteristic. Such measures may result from
constitutional mandates, statutes, administrative
regulations, court orders, or voluntary initiatives.
They extend further than antidiscrimination poli-
cy strictly conceived, insofar as individuals are not
required to provide evidence of discrimination to
bene½t from af½rmative action. Their goal is to
counter deeply entrenched social practices that
reproduce group-structured inequality (even in
the absence of intentional discrimination) by 
creating positive externalities beyond individual
recipients.2 Such measures bene½t groups “with
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whose position and esteem in society
the af½liated individual may be inextri-
cably involved.”3
Af½rmative action policies vary sub-
stantially across countries. Their intended
bene½ciaries may include not only ethnic,
racial, or religious groups held to be eco-
nomically and/or socially disadvantaged,
but also aboriginal peoples, women, the
disabled, or even war veterans. Other
differences between policies relate to
which (more or less flexible) instruments
they use; what the legal norms are from
which they derive; how extensive the
domain of implementation is; and what
their ultimate goal consists of, consider-
ing how the policies work and the justi-
½cations provided to support them. Pro-
grams also vary in how explicitly they
target designated groups and the extent 
to which they bene½t those groups. In
this respect, there are at least three types
of af½rmative action: 
Indirect af½rmative action. These policies
are “purposefully inclusionary” measures4
that appear neutral but are designed to
bene½t disadvantaged groups more than
others. Such measures might be construed
as “disparate impact” discrimination if
the outcomes for the affected groups were
reversed. In the case of race and ethnicity,
one example is a law enacted in Texas in
1997.5 The law requires state universities
to admit the top 10 percent of graduates
from each high school regardless of their
test scores. The purpose is to increase the
percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the
student body, which is made possible by
the large number of high schools in that
state from which virtually all graduates be-
long to one of these two minority groups.
Similarly, in France, formally “color-blind”
yet arguably “race-oriented” policies al-
locate additional ½nancial resources to
educationally and/or economically dis-
advantaged areas. The criteria used for
assessing an area’s need–school perfor-
mance, the percentage of families with
three children or more, and the unem-
ployment rate–are correlated with eth-
nicity: they vary partly according to the 
proportion of African immigrants with-
in the population. In these more or less
conspicuous instances where the state
employs a “substitution strategy,” the
distinctive ethnic pro½le of the bene½-
ciaries appears to be the secondary ef-
fect of a formally neutral principle of
allocation. Yet that anticipated effect is
at least in part the reason the principle
was adopted in the ½rst place. Such mea-
sures reflect the perceived illegitimacy
or unlawfulness of policies that would
address inequities among ethnic groups
in a more straightforward manner.6
Outreach. Outreach programs are pro-
active policies designed to bring a more
diverse range of candidates into a re-
cruitment (or promotion) pool. In this
case, group membership is explicitly tak-
en into account, but in a limited way: it 
is allowed to enter the picture in order to
enlarge the pool from which individuals
will be selected; however, it does not
factor into the selection itself. 
Direct af½rmative action. Sometimes la-
beled (not always pejoratively) “prefer-
ential treatment” in the United States7
and also known as “positive discrimina-
tion” in France and Britain, direct af½r-
mative action grants an advantage to the
members of designated groups in ½nal
decisions for jobs or college acceptance.
More or less flexible policy instruments
may be used, including compulsory quo-
tas, tie-break rules, and aspirational goals
or targets. In this case, an applicant from
one of the designated groups (dga 1)
will be selected for a position for which
he or she is basically quali½ed even if 
at least one applicant from a non-desig-
nated group is deemed more quali½ed. 
If another applicant from a designated
group (dga 2) had the same quali½ca-
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tions as the applicant from the non-des-
ignated group, he or she would have
been selected instead of dga 1.8 In oth-
er words, group membership is the key
factor that triggers the outcome. dga 1
obtains the position only because he or
she is identi½ed as a member of a desig-
nated group. Direct af½rmative action,
the main focus of current political and
legal controversies and the topic of this
essay, can thus be criticized for conflict-
ing with two esteemed principles of the
different societies under consideration:
the meritocratic principle, according to
which the most quali½ed applicant should
always be selected, and the principle of
“blindness” to characteristics such as
race, gender, or caste. 
Contested as it is today, af½rmative
action originally emerged as a strategy
for conflict management in deeply divid-
ed societies. The important exceptions
are Brazil9 and India; in the latter, “res-
ervations” for lower caste members in
government of½ce and higher education
and the extension of bene½ts to a broad-
er group of recipients have, in fact, trig-
gered some violent resistance by urban
upper caste youth in northern states.10
In most cases, however, countries that
believed themselves to be on the brink 
of civil war, or that had experienced at
least some serious unrest, set up af½rma-
tive action policies to alleviate an empir-
ically substantiated risk of mass violence.
Af½rmative action, then, has been under-
stood in part as a last-resort device meant
to deal with or prevent a major crisis in
which the preservation of the social com-
pact was or would have been at stake.
As Justice Albie Sachs of South Africa’s
Constitutional Court explains, countries
that introduce af½rmative action “do so
not to meet widely proclaimed human
rights standards but, sadly, because the
social and economic costs of change are
outweighed by the social and economic
costs of policing the status quo. Put blunt-
ly, af½rmative action has frequently come
about as a rushed and forced response to
what have been called race riots.”11
The United States is a case in point.
Sociologist John David Skrentny has
shown that direct af½rmative action 
programs were the somewhat paradox-
ical outcome of a reversal in law and 
policy that took place in a remarkably
short time frame: the second half of 
the 1960s.12 Indeed, not only did Con-
gress fail to provide such programs with
a constitutional foundation, in contrast
with the pattern observed in India, Ma-
laysia, and South Africa; it also had en-
acted a statute, the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
that seemed to preclude their coming
into existence. The Civil Rights Act pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex by private employers with ½fteen or
more employees; federal, state, and lo-
cal governments; and educational insti-
tutions, employment agencies, and labor
unions. Speci½cally, Title VII of the Act
declared it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”13
Thus, even though the motivating force
behind the bill certainly was to end the
discrimination suffered by blacks, whites
were also protected from race-based dis-
crimination in employment. Further-
more, section 703 (j) of Title VII explicitly
stated: “Nothing contained in this sub-
chapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual . . . because of the
race . . . of such individual . . . on account
of an imbalance. ” Yet the ½rst (direct)
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af½rmative action programs were imple-
mented only a few years later.
The factor most directly accounting
for this dramatic policy innovation was
the bureaucratic rationalization of antidis-
crimination law enforcement by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (eeoc).14 This development, in
turn, was made possible by a highly un-
stable political atmosphere. Between 1964
and 1968, an unprecedented wave of race
riots afflicted American cities, resulting
in several hundred deaths. Alarmed, the
federal government responded to black
leader A. Philip Randolph’s warning
that “the Negro ghettoes in every city
throughout the nation [were] areas of
tension and socio-racial dynamite, near
the brink of similar explosions of vio-
lence.”15 The problem of unemployment
among young urban blacks–understood
to be the underlying cause of that vio-
lence–seemed compelling enough to jus-
tify radical measures that had been dis-
missed a few years earlier. The National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(also known as the Kerner Commission),
which President Johnson had tasked with
investigating the causes of the riots, men-
tioned neither racial quotas nor more
flexible goals. Yet although the means for
implementation were left unspeci½ed in
the Commission’s prescriptions, the se-
verity of the crisis and the breadth of the
commitment needed to prevent further
riots were clear. 
The causal relationship between racial
violence and the introduction of af½rma-
tive action programs was most immedi-
ately perceptible in the ½eld of law en-
forcement. Previously, blacks and His-
panics were nearly absent from the po-
lice forces in predominately black and
Hispanic urban areas. Therefore, one of
the main recommendations submitted
by the Kerner Commission was to “in-
crease substantially the recruitment of
Negroes in the Army National Guard.”
That blacks made up only 1.15 percent of
National Guard members in August 1967
was viewed as a “de½ciency [to] be cor-
rected as soon as possible.”16 From that 
point on, some form of af½rmative ac-
tion beyond outreach was made part of
the recruitment agenda.
In the United States, the role of inter-
racial strife in creating a new decision-
making environment that led to the in-
troduction of direct af½rmative action
was made particularly visible by the ex-
istence of a contradictory prescription in
a statute enacted only a few years earlier.
Yet a similar dynamic has been operating
in other countries. In Malaysia, the May
1969 riots pitting Chinese against Malay
residents of Kuala Lumpur resulted in 
a death toll of several hundred persons
(most of them Chinese). The violence
prompted not only a markedly authori-
tarian turn in the Malaysian political sys-
tem but also the introduction, in 1971, of
a New Economic Policy, which extended
af½rmative action from the public to the
private sector. The government believed
the key to restoring minimal intercom-
munal harmony was to reduce the gap
between the politically dominant Malays
and the economically successful Chinese.
Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the need
to defuse violent conflict sustained by
persistent religious discrimination has
led to a stronger af½rmative action re-
gime. In accordance with the Fair Em-
ployment Act of 1989, all public author-
ities and private sector employers with
more than ten employees are required to
register with the Equality Commission,
periodically submit reviews on the reli-
gious composition of their workforce,
and consider implementing an af½rma-
tive action program whenever discrep-
ancies are substantial.17 By contrast, in
mainland United Kingdom, “positive ac-
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tion” programs are, theoretically, non-
compulsory for private employers.18 In
what is still the only example of a man-
datory quota in U.K. law, section 46 of 
the Police (Northern Ireland) Act of 2000
goes so far as to require that equal num-
bers of Catholics and non-Catholics be
appointed to the police service from a
pool of quali½ed applicants. 
Even in France, where, according to
the prevailing legal doctrine, “color
blindness” has been constitutionalized
(in contrast to the United States19), the
most blatant (yet unacknowledged) vio-
lation of that rule occurred during the Al-
gerian War of Independence. The French
government then launched an ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to legitimize the
colonial order by co-opting its Algerian
subjects in greater numbers. Between 1958
and 1960, a series of af½rmative action
measures–including straight quotas–
was enacted through executive orders
(ordonnances) to promote the integration
of Algerian-born French Muslims into
selected components of the civil service
and public administration.20 In March
2003, to ensure that a similar process of
decolonization through armed conflict
would not take place in New Caledonia,
the French Constitution was amended
to authorize overseas territories to im-
plement preferential measures “in favor
of [their] population in . . . employment,
in the award of licences required for cer-
tain occupations, or regarding the pro-
tection of land assets.”21 The causal link
between violence that threatens to dis-
rupt the existing political order and the
introduction of af½rmative action pro-
grams–a link observed in otherwise
strikingly different cultural and legal
environments–is thus hard to deny.
Another structural feature of af½rma-
tive action regimes is that they are resil-
ient and tend to expand over time. In
theory, the goal of special treatment for
members of disadvantaged groups is to
make the need for it disappear as quickly
as possible; in reality, the programs are
dif½cult to dislodge. Although af½rma-
tive action has generally been conceived
and justi½ed as a temporary measure,22
it tends to become permanent in demo-
cratic societies, where bene½ts, once
given, cannot be easily withdrawn. In
many cases, af½rmative action programs
have even expanded in scope, either em-
bracing additional groups, encompass-
ing wider realms for the same groups, 
or both. 
In the United States, for instance,
af½rmative action almost immediate-
ly spread outward from native-born
blacks to other groups with an argu-
ably lesser need for remedial treatment,
including women23 and other ethno-
racial minorities–Hispanics and Asians
in particular, whose numbers increased
dramatically as a result of immigration
reform. The consequences of extending
the policy’s range received little thought.
It was the exceptional experience of
blacks–and the impulse to remedy the
injustice inflicted on them–that allowed
af½rmative action to be (imperfectly)
legitimized in the ½rst place “and sub-
sequently . . . picked up by other groups
who would not have been able to make
the original claim.”24
Yet even if it had been “politically fea-
sible and socially desirable” to cast af-
½rmative action as a corrective measure
predicated on the sui generis African Amer-
ican experience, a measure exclusively
designed to undo the harm suffered by
members of that particular group, the
Supreme Court held that courts do not
have the capacity to determine whom
should receive preferential treatment. 
As Justice Lewis Powell explained, the
unavoidable comparative assessment of
the degrees of victimization experienced
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by all groups with potential claims for
af½rmative action bene½ts involves a
“kind of variable sociological and polit-
ical analysis . . . [that] does not lie with-
in judicial competence.”25 Instead, the
Court has conditioned the use of race-
based af½rmative action on enhancing
the diversity of viewpoints represented
in higher education,26 a safer argument,
but one that does not prevent the policy
from being extended to an ever-broader
set of groups; indeed, quite the contrary
has happened. 
Moreover, in addition to this ½rst kind
of expansion, while af½rmative action
programs emerged as a requirement im-
posed by the federal government on pub-
lic contractors, they are now in play at
universities, state and local governments,
private ½rms, and regulatory agencies re-
sponsible for granting licenses. In some
domains the Supreme Court made the
policy’s conditions of validity more re-
strictive over time27; in others–such as
higher education–it con½rmed the con-
stitutionality of af½rmative action pro-
vided that the programs remain suit-
ably informal.28
Similar to trends in the United States,
in India quotas in university admissions
and government employment were orig-
inally instituted to help the historically
oppressed Scheduled Castes (scs)–the
“Untouchables”–and Scheduled Tribes
(sts),29 but over time were extended 
to the somewhat better-off lower castes. 
As of 1980, 52 percent of the Indian pop-
ulation was eligible. As in Malaysia and
South Africa, the national af½rmative
action regime now offers bene½ts to as-
criptive (non-gender) groups that make
up a majority of the population, despite a
large-scale resistance to that extension
that persisted over several decades.
Af½rmative action began in India under
British colonial rule as a set of programs
designed for the advancement of the Un-
touchables, ½rst in the ½eld of educa-
tion as early as 1892, then in civil ser-
vice and political of½ce. After the coun-
try gained independence, the 1950 Con-
stitution of India mandated that a pro-
portional number of seats be reserved 
for members of scs in federal and state
legislative assemblies. The Constitution
also enabled states to set aside a popu-
lation-linked share of government jobs
and places in educational institutions
for those groups’ bene½t. Furthermore, 
it authorized the potential extension of
quotas to groups other than scs and sts
in Article 15 (4), which explicitly allows
the states to “mak[e] any special provi-
sion for the advancement of any socially
and educationally backward classes of
citizens.” Yet the ratios used, and even
the de½nition of the relevant groups–
in the case of the so-called Other Back-
ward Classes (obcs)–were left for state
governments to determine. Caste was 
by no means preordained as a de½ning
feature. 
Aside from the case of scs and sts,
both the Constituent Assembly and suc-
cessive post-independence parliaments
expected criteria of “backwardness” to
be de½ned in economic terms; for forty
years, they dismissed the recommenda-
tions of various Backward Classes com-
missions that caste should determine
af½rmative action bene½ts.30 One such
commission, the Mandal Commission,
proposed in 1978 to add a national quo-
ta of 27 percent in government jobs for
obcs. This recommendation was in ad-
dition to the existing (proportional)
quota of 22.5 percent: 15 percent for scs
and 7.5 percent for sts. Although the
obcs were granted af½rmative action
bene½ts in some individual states and
provinces, it was not until the begin-
ning of the 1990s that the proposal was
adopted and received the imprimatur
of India’s Supreme Court.31
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In addition to extending bene½ts to
other groups, India’s quota system has
expanded within the public domain.
Places were reserved for scs and sts
½rst in admission to state colleges and
professional schools, then in appoint-
ments to the state and central adminis-
trative services, and, eventually, in any
number of positions in the public sector.
More recently, as economic liberaliza-
tion–under the direction of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World
Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs
–and the privatization of government
sector jobs have drastically reduced the
reach of af½rmative action, some have
considered bringing the private sector
under the purview of the reservation
policy.32
As the historical developments of the
U.S. and Indian af½rmative action re-
gimes suggest, regardless of whether 
the policy is explicitly authorized in a
country’s Constitution, af½rmative ac-
tion tends to expand to other groups 
and domains. When, initially, the in-
tended bene½ciaries are stigmatized
numerical minorities, the number of
recipients and/or policy areas covered
increases over time. That a similar ex-
pansion takes place in countries where
af½rmative action has been constitution-
alized in more speci½c terms, and where
the policy bene½ts politically dominant
yet economically disadvantaged majority
groups, is therefore hardly surprising.
In most countries where the bene½cia-
ries of af½rmative action (women ex-
cepted) are or originally were minority
groups, the legal validity of targeted 
programs depends on whether the pro-
grams meet a set of formal requirements.
Arguably the most important require-
ment is that the process by which scarce
resources are allocated should not be de-
termined exclusively by group member-
ship. Thus, in the 1963 Balaji v. State of
Mysore decision, while the Indian Su-
preme Court did not object to the use of
caste as a criterion for the identi½cation
of “backwardness,” it held that caste
could not be the only criterion consid-
ered. Similarly, the 1978 U.S. Supreme
Court decision California v. Bakke allowed
university admissions to take race into
account as long as it was treated as just
one among many potential diversity-
enhancing features to be weighed against
all the others.33 In the same vein, the
European Court of Justice has opposed
appointment or promotion schemes
under which women candidates would
be automatically preferred to men34; the
court approved, however, “a tie-break
rule giving preference to women where
women and men are equally quali½ed, 
as long as an equally quali½ed male had
the opportunity to establish that a rea-
son speci½c to his case should tilt the
balance in his favour.”35
These formal constraints are much less
stringent in countries where law discour-
ages resistance to af½rmative action as 
a matter of principle. In Malaysia and
South Africa, where the disadvantaged
groups that bene½t from the policy are
numerical majorities,36 af½rmative ac-
tion programs, unsurprisingly, are both
more extensive and more explicit. Thus,
Malaysia’s 1957 Constitution confers
privileges to bumiputeras (ethnic Malays)
with a view to uplifting their economic
position and thereby eradicating the
remnants of the old colonial order in a
particularly broad range of settings, in-
cluding the award of business licenses
and the distribution of land ownership.37
Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1969
riots, the 1948 Sedition Act was revised
to make it illegal to question the exis-
tence of these privileges.38 Advocating
for the suppression of af½rmative action
thus constitutes a criminal offense pun-
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ishable by up to three years in jail39–
a provision without equivalent in any
other country. 
In South Africa, the 1996 Constitution
was also designed to forestall any argu-
ment over the permissibility of af½rma-
tive action for members of disadvan-
taged groups, with a view to avoiding
legal controversies of the kind that were
then unfolding in the United States. Sec-
tion 9 (2) states: “[T]o promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and
other measures designed to protect or
advance persons, or categories of per-
sons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimi-
nation may be taken.”40 Section 9 (3)
indicates that “the state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, includ-
ing race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sex-
ual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and
birth.”41 Section 9 (5) makes clear that,
in some cases, discrimination may be
considered “fair”; and the 1998 Employ-
ment Equity Act con½rms that “af½rma-
tive action” measures by “designated
employers” vis-à-vis members of “des-
ignated groups” fall under this rubric.42
In Malaysia, in the aftermath of the
events that made reducing group in-
equality appear more urgent than ever,
the constitutional status of af½rmative
action provided the central government
with an already familiar set of programs,
whose scope was then enlarged substan-
tially for the sake of political stability.
Hence the New Economic Policy entailed,
inter alia, the acquisition of shares in pri-
vate corporations on behalf of bumiput-
eras by public authorities. The of½cial
goal of this policy was to promote “the
restructuring of society so as to elimi-
nate the identi½cation of race with eco-
nomic function”43 by 1990. The project
of bringing about a radical, large-scale
social transformation, which arguably
underlies af½rmative action even in lib-
eral democracies,44 was thus made strik-
ingly–and unusually–explicit. 
Similarly, the Employment Equity Act
in South Africa explicitly states that af-
½rmative action measures may “include
preferential treatment.”45 Most distinc-
tively, under sections 20 (3) and 20 (5) 
of the Act, a designated group member’s
lack of the necessary quali½cations is 
not a suf½cient reason for hiring a non-
designated group member instead: the
employer “may not unfairly discriminate
against a person solely on the grounds 
of that person’s lack of relevant experi-
ence.” Rather, the only legitimate matter
of concern is the applicant’s “capacity to
acquire, within a reasonable time, the
ability to do the job.” By squarely reject-
ing the very criterion of merit as conven-
tionally de½ned by the level of quali½ca-
tion, South African law thus embraces a
conception of af½rmative action reflect-
ing the comparatively high degree of le-
gitimacy that the policy enjoys in that
country. This fact is explained largely 
by the clear causal link between current
group inequality and the recently dis-
mantled and morally discredited apart-
heid regime. In this case, af½rmative
action most visibly partakes of a simul-
taneously corrective and prospective
strategy geared toward the deracializa-
tion of power and the structural trans-
formation of the polity in an egalitarian
direction. This approach is in line with
the reference to the “crea[tion] of a new
order” in the Preamble of the 1993 In-
terim Constitution46 and the Postam-
ble’s de½nition of this document’s ulti-
mate purpose as being no less than the
“reconstruction of society.”47
How do these different af½rmative
action regimes de½ne the social out-
come, the attainment of which would
116
Af½rmative
Action in
Compar-
ative
Perspective
Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
justify the termination of the policy? Two
cases might be usefully distinguished.
In some countries–such as Malaysia, for
instance–the proportionality criterion
provides an obvious and relatively un-
controversial “focal point.”48 In others–
such as the United States, by contrast–
proportional representation is emphati-
cally rejected as a distributive principle,
even though it arguably operates covert-
ly at the policy-making level by de½ning
the benchmark against which “discrep-
ancies” and “de½ciencies” will be iden-
ti½ed and compensated for. Yet at the
end of the day, one may well argue that
the ultimate goal of af½rmative action
will be reached only when it will not occur
to anyone to verify the percentage of black
students or employees at a given univer-
sity or enterprise. If race should eventual-
ly become–according to the color-blind
ideal–as negligible a physical character-
istic as eye color,49 it would not be a mat-
ter of simply knowing that there is no cor-
relation between that trait and the posi-
tions held by individuals in the econom-
ic and occupational hierarchy. Rather,
societies must reach a point at which no
one would even think of undertaking an
empirical investigation designed to ½nd
out. In this respect, at least in countries
where the ideal of societal integration is
the strongest, an irreducible paradox of
af½rmative action policy is that it openly
aims to eliminate the conditions that
justify its implementation. 
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